Table of contents
- Insider trading statistics at a glance
- SEC enforcement volume from FY 2005 to FY 2014
- Major cases and profit figures in the dataset
- What the recent SEC record shows
- How the case mix changes the picture
- Reading the numbers carefully
- Useful comparisons from the dataset
Insider trading statistics are easiest to read when the enforcement totals and the marquee cases sit side by side. This dataset does that well: it shows a decade of SEC enforcement counts, a cluster of major scheme-level figures, and the more recent shift toward data-driven detection and market-abuse analytics.
Insider trading statistics at a glance
- The SEC recorded 50 insider trading enforcement actions in FY 2005 and 52 in FY 2014 (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
- The highest annual total in the FY 2005-FY 2014 series was 61 in FY 2008 (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
- The lowest annual total in that same series was 37 in FY 2009 (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
- The Galleon-related insider trading actions charged 32 defendants and were tied to more than $33 million in illicit gains (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report).
- The Peterson insider trading scheme generated more than $5.2 million in illicit profits (SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report).
- The FY 2023 addendum listed 32 insider trading actions, including 23 civil insider-trading actions and 9 standalone administrative insider-trading proceedings (fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf).
- The FY 2023 addendum said insider trading was 4% of total SEC actions and 6% of civil and standalone APs (fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf).
- The FY 2024 enforcement results highlighted advanced data analytics and the first insider-trading trial based on alleged peer-company trading in SEC v. Panuwat (SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).
The dataset makes a clear point: insider trading enforcement is not just a single-number story, but a mix of annual totals, case-specific profit figures, and changing investigative methods.
SEC enforcement volume from FY 2005 to FY 2014
The cleanest long-run comparison in the dataset is the FY 2005 to FY 2014 SEC enforcement series. It gives a narrow but useful view of how often insider trading appeared in the agency’s annual enforcement mix (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
| Fiscal year | Insider trading enforcement actions | Source |
|---|---|---|
| FY 2005 | 50 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2006 | 46 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2007 | 47 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2008 | 61 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2009 | 37 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2010 | 53 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2011 | 57 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2012 | 58 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2013 | 44 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
| FY 2014 | 52 | SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics |
A few patterns stand out immediately. First, the series does not move in a straight line. It moves between the high 30s and low 60s, which means year-to-year changes were material rather than cosmetic. Second, the midpoint of the series sits in the low 50s, with several years clustering around that level. Third, the spike to 61 in FY 2008 and the drop to 37 in FY 2009 show that the annual count could change sharply from one year to the next (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
That matters because raw enforcement counts often get oversimplified. A figure like 52 in FY 2014 can look steady on its own, but compared with 37 in FY 2009 and 61 in FY 2008, it is better read as part of a volatile enforcement cycle rather than a fixed baseline (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
What the decade view suggests
The decade view supports three practical observations:
- Enforcement remained active across the full period, with every year in the dataset showing dozens of actions (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
- The series had a meaningful low point in FY 2009, followed by a rebound in FY 2010 and FY 2011 (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
- By FY 2012 through FY 2014, totals stayed in a relatively tight band of 44 to 58, which suggests a more stable level after earlier swings (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
Major cases and profit figures in the dataset
The dataset also contains case-level statistics that are more useful for understanding scale than annual totals alone. These numbers show how large some insider trading matters became, how many people were implicated, and how much profit or avoided loss was alleged or recorded (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report; SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report; Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report).
Galleon-related matters
The Galleon-related insider trading actions were especially large in the dataset. The SEC charged 32 defendants in its Galleon-related insider trading actions (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report). The same report says the scheme generated more than $33 million in illicit gains (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report). It also says the Galleon collection of cases involved six additional people charged in November 2009 before the case was broadened by 13 more individuals and entities (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report).
The report further states that the SEC called the Galleon matter the largest hedge fund insider trading investigation to date and that the SEC charged 19 other high-ranking corporate executives and insiders in related Galleon actions (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report).
Those facts point in the same direction: this was not a narrow prosecution. It was a wide investigation with a large defendant set and a large reported gain figure.
Cutillo, Peterson, and Johnson figures
Other case figures in the dataset show how varied insider trading matters can be. The Cutillo insider trading ring involved $20 million in illicit gains (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report). The Peterson insider trading scheme generated more than $5.2 million in illicit profits (SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report). Drew Clayton Peterson tipped several close friends who traded ahead of the Mariner Energy takeover announcement (SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report).
The former Nasdaq managing director Donald L. Johnson traded in the stock of six companies on at least nine occasions, and Johnson realized illicit profits of more than $755,000 (SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report).
Those numbers matter because they show that insider trading cases in the dataset range from sub-million profit levels to very large multi-million-dollar schemes. The legal category is the same, but the scale differs sharply.
Liang and the FDA announcement pattern
The Cheng Yi Liang figures add another useful dimension. Liang traded before 28 public FDA announcement dates and his trading involved 20 publicly traded companies (SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report). Liang generated more than $3.6 million in illicit profits and avoided losses, and the profits and losses avoided totaled over $3.7 million (SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report).
That combination is important because it links the number of trading opportunities to the size of the alleged benefit. The dataset does not just give a profit figure. It also shows the breadth of the trading pattern behind it.
A compact comparison of selected cases
| Case or matter | People or entities mentioned | Reported figure | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Galleon-related insider trading actions | 32 defendants | More than $33 million in illicit gains | SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report |
| Cutillo insider trading ring | Not stated | $20 million in illicit gains | SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report |
| Peterson insider trading scheme | Not stated | More than $5.2 million in illicit profits | SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report |
| Donald L. Johnson trading | Not stated | More than $755,000 in illicit profits | SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report |
| Cheng Yi Liang trading | Not stated | More than $3.6 million in illicit profits and avoided losses | SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report |
The table makes a useful point: some matters are best understood by the size of the money involved, while others are better understood by the number of defendants or the number of events traded around.
What the recent SEC record shows
The recent SEC figures in the dataset show a different picture from the older decade series. Instead of only counting annual matters, the newer material highlights case structure, percentages, and detection methods (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report; fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf; SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).
The FY 2020 report said insider trading accounted for 8% of enforcement matters that year and also 8% of all enforcement actions that year (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report). That same report noted that the Amazon finance manager insider trading case involved trading before earnings announcements between January 2016 and July 2018 (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report). It also said the Palo Alto Networks IT administrator case involved four friends who were also charged, and the senior index manager and his friend generated more than $900,000 in illegal profits (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report).
The FY 2020 report further described an international insider trading series involving one investment banker, one New York-based trader, two former investment bankers, one London-based trader, and two traders based in Switzerland (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report). It also said parallel criminal actions were filed in connection with each of those four FY 2020 insider-trading cases (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report). And it said the SEC brought insider-trading actions against a husband and wife in a Sagent Pharmaceuticals scheme in FY 2020 (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report).
There is also an operational signal in the report. The FY 2020 report said the SEC opened 2 dozen trading suspensions in March and April for COVID-19 disclosure questions, and it said the SEC’s analysis and detection center detected suspicious trading patterns using data tools (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report).
That is a different kind of statistic from the older enforcement-count series. It tells you something about method, not just volume.
How the case mix changes the picture
The FY 2023 addendum and FY 2024 enforcement results show that the SEC’s public framing of insider trading now includes both total counts and technology-led detection (fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf; SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).
The FY 2023 addendum listed 32 insider trading actions, including 23 civil insider-trading actions and 9 standalone administrative insider-trading proceedings (fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf). It also showed insider trading was 4% of total SEC actions and 6% of civil and standalone APs (fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf). Finally, it recorded 61 insider-trading parties in parentheses (fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf).
That combination shows that the headline count alone can hide the structure underneath it. A single “32 actions” figure becomes more informative when paired with the civil versus administrative split and the party count. Those added dimensions show whether the enforcement footprint was concentrated in a few large matters or distributed across many smaller ones.
The FY 2024 enforcement results then add a different layer. The SEC said it used advanced data analytics and technology to investigate market abuse and MNPI misuse (SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024). It also highlighted the first insider-trading trial based on alleged peer-company trading in SEC v. Panuwat, and the report said that trial followed an eight-day trial and a jury verdict for insider trading (SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).
Taken together, these newer figures suggest two things:
- Detection is becoming more data-intensive.
- The SEC’s insider trading theory can now extend to newer fact patterns, not only classic tips and direct trades (SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).
Reading the numbers carefully
The dataset is strong, but it still needs careful reading. Several figures measure annual enforcement actions. Others measure defendants, parties, illicit gains, profits avoided, or related criminal actions. Those are not interchangeable measures, and combining them without context can create a misleading picture (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics; SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report; SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report; Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report; fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf; SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).
A few practical rules help keep the statistics straight:
- Treat annual enforcement counts as a volume measure, not a measure of dollar impact.
- Treat profit or illicit gain figures as scale indicators for individual matters, not as annual totals.
- Treat party counts and defendant counts as a way to understand how broad a matter was.
- Treat percentage-of-enforcement figures as a mix indicator, not a severity indicator.
- Treat references to data analytics and detection centers as method signals, not outcome totals.
That is why the source labels matter so much. When a paragraph says “SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics,” you know you are looking at annual counts. When a paragraph says “SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report” or “SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report,” you know you are looking at case-level descriptions and amounts. When a paragraph says “fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf” or “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024,” you are in the newer reporting framework.
Useful comparisons from the dataset
Here are the most useful side-by-side comparisons in the source material:
- FY 2008 versus FY 2009: 61 actions versus 37 actions, a sharp year-over-year drop in the annual series (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
- FY 2005 versus FY 2014: 50 actions versus 52 actions, showing that the start and end of the decade series were close even though the middle fluctuated (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics).
- Galleon versus Peterson: more than $33 million in illicit gains versus more than $5.2 million in illicit profits, showing how large the top-end matters could be (SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report; SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report).
- FY 2023 versus FY 2020: 32 insider trading actions in the FY 2023 addendum versus insider trading at 8% of enforcement matters in FY 2020, showing a shift from percentage framing to explicit action counts and split counts (Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report; fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf).
- FY 2024 versus earlier years: the SEC’s advanced data analytics emphasis and the Panuwat trial show a more technologically driven enforcement posture than the older count-only series (SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).
If you want the strongest one-sentence takeaway from the whole dataset, it is this: insider trading enforcement has stayed active over time, but the best statistics are the ones that combine annual counts, case scale, and detection method rather than relying on a single number (SEC Year-by-Year Enforcement Statistics; SEC 2010 Performance and Accountability Report; SEC 2011 Performance and Accountability Report; Division of Enforcement 2020 Annual Report; fy23-enforcement-statistics.pdf; SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024).